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17 October 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security (PSI)
SUBJECT : Functions of Personnel Security and
Investigations (Clearance Division)
REFERENCE : Chief, PP&AD (P&M) Request dated
5 October 1973

1. Submitted herewith are the Clearance Division
function statements as requested in reference.

2. Productivity measures for these functions are
made a matter of record in Division monthly statistical
and annual reports.

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Chief, Clearance Division

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Office of Security Staff Personnel Clearances (E.O. 10450, E.O. 10491, E.O. 10501, [redacted] (2) (b&c)

25X1A Function (activity) title * 10491, E.O. 10501, [redacted]
Responsible Organization Unit Staff Evaluation Section/Staff & Ops Br/CD

Resources Allocated:

Personnel: Staff Contract Other

Funds:

Personnel

Other (list)

Total:

25X1A

Total:

Brief description of function: Processing all staff clearances which cover professional and clerical employees, staff agent conversions and consultants. This processing includes the assignment of cases to [redacted] for investigation, management and supervision of the cases until completion, appraisal of the cases, and recommendations for approval or disapproval after evaluating the data developed by investigation.

Through this function personnel to be utilized by the Agency in a staff capacity are screened to ensure that they meet qualification standards for employment and access to official data.

Consequences (impact) of deletion: See separate page.

Alternatives: See separate page.

Possible incremental changes, with resource requirements: None indicated. The Office of Security has the responsibility to accomplish this priority function for the Agency; i.e., the Office of Personnel, as a quality endeavor and on a most expedient and timely basis.

*Indicate if this function is in support of a statutory, NSCID, DCID, regulatory, interagency agreement requirement.

Consequences (impact) of deletion: Deletion of this function would result in a lack of direction and destroy the effecting of the DCI responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods and the use of human resources utilized by the Agency in a staff employee capacity. It would also deter the Director of Security in carrying out his regulatory responsibility under [REDACTED]

25X1A to obtain and evaluate through investigation, technical interrogation, and liaison contact with other U. S. agencies, pertinent information regarding personnel for employment, assignment or association with the Agency and to approve or disapprove, from a security standpoint, the employment or utilization of these individuals.

Alternatives: To accomplish clearance actions on less than minimum standards. This would require the DCI to lower the standards of DCID 1/14 or abolish DCID 1/14 in its entirety throughout the Intelligence Community. Similar statutory changes would be required in HR's and E.O. 10450, etc. As appraisal and determination functions can only be validly accomplished based on as complete as possible factual information on all aspects of an applicant's background and educational and employment history, appraisals made would be of below minimum quality and would work to the detriment not only of the applicant's rights, but also would open the Agency and the national interest to unlimited possibilities of security compromise.

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Function (activity) title * Staff-like clearances. E.O. 10450, [redacted],
E.O. 10491, E.O. 10501, [redacted]Responsible Organization Unit Support Evaluation Section, Staff & Operation
Branch, Clearance Division

Resources Allocated:

25X1A

Personnel: Staff Contract Other

Funds:

25X1A

Total:

Personnel

Other (list)

Total:

Brief description of function: Processing of overt clearance requests for all other cases involving staff-like access; i.e., military assignees Contract Type Internal, independent contractors, covert associates, etc. Includes assignment of cases for field investigation, management and supervision of cases to completion, appraisal, and adjudication of cases for utilization or nonutilization.

Benefits: To assure that personnel utilized by the Agency in staff-like capacities meet security standards and criteria for assignment and access to official data.

Consequences (impact) of deletion: Deletion of this function would disable the ability of the Director of Security to effect the DCF's responsibility for the protection of intelligence, sources, and methods; and deter him from carrying out his regulatory responsibilities to obtain and evaluate personnel security information, to approve or disapprove, from the security standpoint, the employment or utilization of those individuals.

See separate page.

Possible incremental changes, with resource requirements:

See separate page.

*Indicate if this function is in support of a statutory, NSCID, DCID, regulatory, interagency agreement requirement.

Alternatives: To accomplish clearance actions on less than regulatory requirements. Would require that legal and Congressional action be taken to amend and/or repeal basic executive orders, and in addition the DCI's responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. Should standards be lowered, the investigation, appraisal, and evaluation process would have to be carried out without the advantage of factual pertinent data, which could only result in a lowering in quality of the clearance process, and the acceptance of greater risks of personnel penetrations in the Agency and United States Government.

Possible incremental changes, with resource requirements: None indicated. The Office of Security must perform the clearance function for Agency wide requestors in order that Agency manpower needs are met. Effective and timely accomplishment of this function is required by the requesting office.

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Function (activity) title: Security Liaison and Agency Panel Responsibility: Agency Policy and USIB Endorsement 14
August 1967, DDS Directive 1953, and [redacted] STATINTL
Responsible Organization Unit: Staff and Operations Branch/Clearance Division.

Resources Allocated:

Personnel: Staff Contract Other

Funds:

ATINTL

Total:

[redacted]

Personnel

Other (list)

Total:

Brief description of function: Liaison with security and counterintelligence elements of USIB and non-USIB federal agencies. Represents Office of Security on the Applicant Review Panel and the Overseas Candidate Review Panel.

Benefits: Required function is in direct support of Agency Personnel Security Program. Panel representation fulfills the requirements of policy directives and regulations, and enables Agency personnel, medical, and security evaluation of serious suitability issues essential to employment applications, and the overseas assignment of Agency personnel. Liaison function is part of the life blood of effective and efficient overall security program.

Consequences (Impact) of deletion:

allowing most effective coordination and interaction in complex and sensitive personnel security areas.

See separate page.

Alternatives: Loss of liaison function would result in lesser effectiveness in personnel security program with higher cost probabilities for security operation due to duplications in effort in the Intelligence Community in resolving mutual personnel security problems.

Possible incremental changes, with resource requirements: None indicated. Panel actions are programmed on a weekly basis requiring representation from the Office of Security. Liaison requirements are on a continuing priority basis which must be conducted.

*Indicate if this function is in support of a statutory, NSCID, DCID, regulatory, interagency agreement requirement.

Consequences (impact) of deletion: Deletion of function would require a change in Agency policies. It would, in effect, destroy effectiveness of Panel actions which result in clear savings to the Agency in the selection out of those applicants who fail to meet employment criteria based on serious suitability or qualification grounds.

25X1A Function (activity) title * [REDACTED]

Industrial Security Approvals, DCID 1/14,

Responsible Organization Unit [REDACTED] Industrial and Certification Branch,
Clearance Division

STATINTL

Resources Allocated:

Personnel: Staff Contract Other

Funds:

25X9

Total:

Personnel

Other (list)

Total:

Brief description of function: Security processing and granting of clearance/approvals on all industrial personnel utilized by the Agency. Involves scheduling of investigations, management and supervision of the case until completed, appraisal of entire investigative and record coverage, preparation of case summary, and determination as to utilization or nonutilization of individual based on security evaluation of benefits.

See separate page. case against statutory regulations which establish standards and criteria for use.

Consequences (impact) of deletion:

See separate page.

Alternatives: Function is required by DCID 1/14 and other stated regulations. Would require appropriate change in or abolishment of these statutory issuances.

Possible incremental changes, with resource requirements:

See separate page.

*Indicate if this function is in support of a statutory, NSCID, DCID, regulatory, interagency agreement requirement.

Benefits: Protects the security of Agency classified data, contracting procedures, and other intelligence efforts and methodology involved under the contract at the industrial level.

Consequences (impact) of deletion: Deletion of function would deter the Director of Security from his requirements to effect the DCI's responsibility for the protection of intelligence data, sources, and methods. As many of the Agency's most sensitive activities are involved in R&D and D&E within industry, deletion of the security function would open the Agency's operational activities to compromise and penetration, with serious harm to the national interest.

Possible incremental changes, with resource requirements: None indicated. As standards and criteria are established in DCID 1/14, etc., a lessening of coverage is not negotiable, nor recommended. As the quality of the security evaluation is directly related to the effect and quality of the investigation conducted; a lesser standard would open the Agency to a greater risk of compromise. In addition, clearances are requested by Directorates outside the Office of Security; e.g., DDS&T, Office of Logistics, etc. Clearance action must be accomplished on timely basis so as not to delay or otherwise jeopardize contractual competition.

25X1A Facility Access Approvals and [redacted]
25X1A Function (activity) title * [redacted], and
25X1A [redacted] AEC "Q" [redacted]
25X1A Responsible Organization Unit Services Section, Industrial and
25X1A Certification Branch, Clearance Division
25X1A Resources Allocated:

Personnel: Staff Contract Other

Funds:

25X9

Personnel

Total:

Other (list)

Total:

25X1A

Brief description of function: Security processing and granting of clearances/approvals on Service type personnel utilized by the Agency. Security processing of cases for [redacted] and

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[redacted] Processing AEC "Q" clearances. Involves processing of cases to field for investigation, supervision of cases to completion, appraisal of all investigative data, and recommendation summary action for approval or nonapproval for utilization. Includes badging actions as appropriate. See separate page.

Consequences (impact) of deletion: Deletion of this function would result in loss of the Director of Security's capability to effect the DCI's responsibility for the protection of intelligence information, sources, and methods. Inability to fully process and screen these personnel could open the Agency and the national interest to possible serious security compromise.

Alternatives: Lower the standards for investigation and screening criteria through legal and congressional action in order to amend or abolish the appropriate regulatory orders, DCID's, and security policy requirements. As indicated, this action would open the Agency to greater risks of compromise through personnel penetrations.

Possible incremental changes, with resource requirements: None indicated. Clearances are required by Directorates outside of the Office of Security. These actions are required on a timely basis in order that Agency activities can continue to function without delay or down time.

*Indicate if this function is in support of a statutory, NSCID, DCID, regulatory, interagency agreement requirement.

Benefits: Personnel utilized in the Headquarters building and in installations in Service capacities are screened to ensure that they meet security qualification standards for access to sensitive areas and official classified data.

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Function (activity) title * [REDACTED] Actions,

Responsible Organization Unit [REDACTED] Industrial and STATINTL
Certification Branch, Clearance Division.
Resources Allocated:

25X1A

Personnel: Staff Contract Other

Funds:

Total:

Personnel

Other (list)

Total:

25X9

Brief description of function: See separate page.

Benefits: See separate page.

Consequences (impact) of deletion: Deletion of function would largely disable ability of Agency personnel to pursue their liaison and inter-Agency official activities as clearance certification requirements are essential throughout the Intelligence Community and Government. Deletion of other actions would cause a loss of control in the requirements to assure the continued security integrity of Agency personnel through change of status or transfer of duties.

See separate page.

Possible incremental changes, with resource requirements: None indicated. Clearance Division must be responsive both to regulatory issuances in these function areas and to operating requirements of Agency offices.

*Indicate if this function is in support of a statutory, NSCID, DCID, regulatory, interagency agreement requirement.

Brief Description of Function: Certifications, security processing and approval of all types of codeword clearances, and other security approval or concurrence actions. Includes many review actions to determine suitability for codeword clearances, transfer and reassignment actions, visitor-no-escort badging, and many other miscellaneous actions. Handles a high volume of file reviews and certification actions to enable Agency personnel to visit and have official data in other government offices and installations. Maintains liaison with security counterparts in these government offices. Processes all types of marriage cases, including special requirements of alien marriages under Agency regulations. Certifies Agency personnel to other government agencies [REDACTED] 25X1

Benefits: Provides security review and concurrence approval for a wide variety of actions in support of Agency personnel and their official functions. Ensures that Agency security requirements are maintained in change of status actions involving personnel, including marriages and transfer actions. Enables Agency personnel to visit and have access to official data of other United States Government offices through clearance certification actions.

Alternatives: Place the responsibility on other Directorates and offices for overall security certification actions for their personnel. Change cited regulations as enabling actions for these purposes. This alternative decentralization would result in a requirement in many other offices for additional personnel and in effect would not lower personnel requirements in Clearance Division as security information would have to be passed to these other offices in order that valid certifications could be made. Alternative would be uneconomic and result in confusion and inefficiency.

25X1A Function (activity) title *Employee Reinvestigations [REDACTED]

Responsible Organization Unit [REDACTED]

Research Br [REDACTED] STATINTL

Resources Allocated:

Personnel: Staff Contract Other

Funds:

TINTL

Total: [REDACTED]

Personnel

Other (list)

Total:

Brief description of function: On a 5 year cycle, assign staff employee cases [REDACTED] for reinvestigation, manage and supervise these cases until completed, appraise them, and initiate a recommendation for further action if the data developed raises a security question concerning continued access to official data.

Benefits: The reinvestigation function assures that an orderly, continuous review of employee files occurs under the regulatory requirement of [REDACTED]. The reinvestigation requirement is additionally essential under DCID 1/14 requirements for that large number of Agency employees who require codeword access in their responsibility area. STATINTL

Consequences (impact) of deletion: The deletion of this function would negate the Director of Security's regulatory responsibility under [REDACTED] to ensure a continuous review of employee files.

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Alternatives: None as long as the security of current employees is to be revalidated under regulatory requirements and as a basic part of the counterintelligence review.

Possible incremental changes, with resource requirements: None envisioned. In fact, additional emphasis is indicated against this important security action and review.

*Indicate if this function is in support of a statutory, NSCID, DCID, regulatory, interagency agreement requirement.

Function (activity) title * Exploitation of Counterintelligence Information

25X1A*

Responsible Organization Unit Research STATINTL

Resources Allocated:

Personnel: Staff Contract Other

Funds:

ATINTL

Total:

Personnel

Other (list)

Total:

Brief description of function: The centralized and continuous monitoring of all counterintelligence information bearing on Agency personnel from all sources until the issues raised are satisfactorily resolved. This resolution process involves research, investigation and interrogation and may involve counterespionage.

Benefits: This function assures that a vital program exists within the Agency to detect and prevent hostile penetrations of the Agency through its employees.

Consequences (impact) of deletion: Deletion would, in essence, deprive the Director of Security of the only centralized, orderly and systematic program providing him with the necessary tools to fulfill his regulatory responsibility under for the conduct of internal Counterintelligence programs to detect and prevent hostile penetrations of the Agency through its employees.

ATINTL

Alternatives: With the proper transfer of authority and realignment of resources, the CI Staff of the DDO would be the only existing in-house organization to perform the function. Such transfer would engender a considerable loss of objectivity, confusion as to areas of responsibilities, and an over-centralization of the CI function.

Possible incremental changes, with resource requirements: None envisioned.

*Indicate if this function is in support of a statutory, NSCID, DCID, regulatory, interagency agreement requirement.